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Abstract—As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, 
regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate 
them without loss of safety or major disruption to existing 
airspace operations. This work addresses the development of the 
Safeguard system as an assured safety net technology for UAS. 
The Safeguard system  monitors and enforces conformance to a 
set of rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial stay-out or 
stay-in regions, speed limits, altitude limits). Safeguard operates 
independently of the UAS autopilot and is strategically designed 
in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable functions 
to simplify compliance with regulatory standards for commercial 
aircraft. A framework is described that decouples the system 
from any other devices on the UAS as well as introduces 
complementary positioning source(s) for applications that 
require integrity and availability beyond what the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) can provide. Additionally, the high 
level logic embedded within the software is presented, as well as 
the steps being taken toward verification and validation (V&V) 
of proper functionality. Next, an initial prototype implementation 
of the described system is disclosed. Lastly, future work 
including development, testing, and system V&V is summarized. 
Keywords—assured containment; geo-fencing; Unmanned 
Aircraft System, formal methods; UAS Traffic Management (UTM) 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 The recent advancement of UAS related technologies has 
caused a substantial increase in the desired use of such vehicles 
over the past few years. Entities in the public and private 
sectors around the world have begun to discover the potential 
benefits of UAS operations and are lobbying regulatory 
authorities to develop procedures to allow for more widespread 
operation. Until recently, commercial use of UAS in the United 
States (US) has been authorized primarily under Section 333 
exemptions to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) [1]. In 
June 2016, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
released Part 107 containing regulations to be included in the 
FARs for commercial use of small UAS [2]. The regulations 
under Part 107 cover UAS (a) weighing less than 55 lb, (b) 
operating in visual line-of-sight, and (c) operating under 400 ft 
above ground level or within 400 ft of a structure. UAS 
operating under Part 107 are prohibited from flying over any 
persons not directly participating in the operation.  
 While the steps taken under Part 107 enable a considerable 
number of UAS operations, additional regulations are needed 
for widespread use of larger, more capable UAS. Regulatory 
authorities around the world are working to broaden their 
regulatory frameworks for the rapidly growing and evolving 
UAS market. In doing so, authorities must strive to meet public 
demands for affordability without compromising their 
responsibilities to protect citizens, citizen’s rights, and 
property; while also not crippling the UAS market through 
over-regulation.  
 Regulatory authorities in the commercial aviation sector 
have created a complex set of rules over many decades that 
provide high assurance with respect to safety while still 
satisfying the needs of multiple stakeholders. However, many 
of the methods that are used to comply with these rules (e.g., 
redundant systems, complex software and hardware 
certification processes, radar and human surveillance) would 
burden the UAS industry due to their high costs. Thus, many of 
the strategies used for achieving high levels of safety on 
commercial aircraft are not practical for the UAS market. 
Furthermore, while several research efforts have been 
undertaken to develop aviation-grade systems for UAS, little to 
no success has been achieved in terms of meeting reliability 
standards of conventionally piloted aircraft (CPA) [3]-[6]. This 
creates a precarious situation wherein an expedient strategy for 
integrating UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS) is 
desired, but the means to do so properly do not currently exist.  
 As an incremental step, the FAA has suggested 
“developing design standards tailored to a specific UAS 
application and proposed operating environment” [7]. This 
approach is consistent with the European Aviation Safety 
Agency’s (EASA’s) operations-centric framework for UAS 
operations [8]. Based on these regulatory approaches, Hayhurst 
et al. recently performed a case study to develop design 
standards for a 1000-lb unmanned rotorcraft with specific 
consideration for its operation in a rural agricultural 
environment [9]. At the heart of the aforementioned work, the 
authors establish two ideas that are fundamental to the research 
proposed in this paper. 
 Assertion #1: For a UAS, hull loss, in itself, is not a 
catastrophic failure condition with respect to safety. 
 For a CPA, the pilot, crew and passengers must be 
protected to avoid serious injury or loss of life. Consequently, 
hull loss is considered a catastrophic event for CPA. 
Furthermore, the hull of the aircraft must be preserved, as the 
vehicle itself is a valuable asset. In contrast, hull loss for UAS 
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 does not inevitably endanger human life or property. The 
safety-related consequences of hull loss or loss of control for 
UAS largely depend on the environment in which the UAS 
operates. There are many possible UAS missions intended for 
sparsely populated or remote areas that pose little safety risk to 
people and property. Additionally, some unmanned vehicles 
are designed to be frangible or disposable, and many are 
relatively inexpensive. Therefore, prevention of hull loss is not 
always a substantial concern with respect to safety or economic 
loss. However, hull loss of a UAS is a safety concern with 
respect to collateral damage to other aircraft and to people and 
property on the ground. Under Assertion #1, the primary safety 
concern for UAS is not protecting the hull, but rather it is 
preventing catastrophic collateral damage. 
 Assertion #2: If UAS operations are kept within areas that 
minimize risk of collateral damage by minimizing exposure, 
safety standards and procedures can be simplified and 
minimized.  
 The Section 333 process and Part 107 are codified 
examples of this assertion. Both use extensive operational 
limitations to minimize risk of collateral damage, and 
consequently relieve approved applicants of requirements 
typical of airworthiness certification. This approach partitions 
the hazard space: one partition for hazards outside of the 
approved operational area, and the other for hazards within the 
operational area. This approach works well for missions where 
the operational area is confined to uninhabited, often low-
altitude, environments. In such environments, hull loss is an 
economic concern, instead of a safety concern. Therein lies the 
opportunity to reduce the effort needed to establish 
airworthiness criteria for UAS built for such operations, as 
long as the method of containment to the operational area is 
highly reliable. In that case, many of the typical airworthiness 
requirements necessary to protect the physical vehicle are not 
necessary for the safety of the UAS. The focus of airworthiness 
standards in effect shifts from protection of the air vehicle to a 
focus on the system that ensures flights remain within the 
approved operational area (i.e., assured containment). This may 
allow the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components 
for many UAS systems.  
 Geo-fencing is one method commonly deployed to contain 
UAS within a specific operational volume or stay-in region 
[10][11]. Most current geo-fencing techniques, such as those in 
commercially available autopilots, are effective in many 
scenarios, thus serving as a first line of defense against a 
breach of a stay-in region. However, neither commercial 
autopilots nor the geo-fences are typically developed in 
compliance with conventional certification standards for 
safety-critical systems. As a result, the reliability and 
dependability of these geo-fencing systems are unknown (at 
best) and inadequate (at worst). Most geo-fences reside on the 
same processor as the UAS’s autopilot and share the same data 
sources. This lack of independence creates a single point of 
failure, whereby a hardware failure can cause a failure in both 
the autopilot and the geo-fencing function. Likewise, a 
software failure or data error in the geo-fence could lead to 
undesirable behavior by the autopilot. Stevens and Atkins 
provide a good discussion of how a geo-fencing system could 
be employed independent of the autopilot, and how different 
guidance modes can be defined to “replace the default 
guidance system” when a boundary violation is detected [12].  
 In addition to independence from the autopilot, the core 
functionality of a containment system depends on a reliable 
geo-referenced position estimate. Reliance on the Global 
Positioning System (GPS), or any combination of Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), can create another single 
point of failure. These space-based radio frequency (RF) 
systems share many common failure modes due to issues such 
as multipath, signal attenuation, and shadowing, and therefore, 
cannot be reliably depended on in a standalone manner.  
 To mitigate these issues in the context of our two safety 
assertions, the research presented here focuses on the 
development of a system, called Safeguard, that can provide a 
means of enforcing geospatial stay-in and stay-out regions 
while also achieving the reliability and dependability needed to 
satisfy conventional certification standards for CPA. The 
Safeguard system does not rely on other electronics on a UAS, 
is based on a minimal number of highly assured functions, and 
can be tailored to meet different assurance levels. From an 
integration standpoint, Safeguard can be easily ported to 
virtually any vehicle with almost no change to the UAS. 
Additionally, complementary positioning sources may be 
included as a means to mitigate hazards whose cause is sole 
reliance on GPS.  
 The following section lays out the Safeguard design 
framework, including its hardware mechanization, description 
of high level logic, and the inclusion of non-GNSS based 
positioning data. Additionally, the steps being taken toward 
meeting high assurance requirements are discussed. 
Subsequently, the current Safeguard system prototype and the 
results of initial flight tests are presented as a proof of concept. 
Finally, future work including plans for further development, 
testing, and system V&V are discussed. 
II. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
 
Safeguard is designed to monitor and predict non-
conformance to a set of operating constraints. The current 
prototype device monitors and predicts non-conformance with 
geospatial stay-in and stay-out regions. Extensions of the 
prototype to include other mission-specific constraints such as 
maximum path deviation, speed limits, altitude limits is 
planned. The Safeguard device is isolated and independent of 
the unmanned aircraft’s autopilot and operating system, and is 
easily implemented on most COTS UAS. The current design 
requires no inputs from any other onboard systems during 
flight and produces two outputs. The first output provides a 
warning to the autopilot of predicted violations to allow the 
autopilot an opportunity to change course. The second output 
terminates the flight if the vehicle does not respond adequately 
to the warning. The termination signal may be used in various 
ways (e.g., with different contingency maneuvers) depending 
on mission and safety requirements. Safeguard is agnostic to 
line-of-sight, does not require a command and control link, 
and can be configured without sole reliance on GPS. Lastly, 
the unit is designed to be small, lightweight, low-power, and 
 independently powered. The current target size, weight, and 
power (SWAP) is approximately 1”x2”x3”, 8 oz, and 300 mA 
(See Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Safeguard Target Form Factor. 
 
As will be discussed further in Section III, Safeguard has 
been designed from the outset to be a highly reliable system 
that can comply with aerospace standards for safety-critical 
systems. Compliance with system safety standards is a means 
within the aviation industry of assuring that a system will 
perform its intended function.  For Safeguard, that means that 
the unmanned aircraft (UA) will always stay within its 
prescribed operational area (stay-in region) and out of 
specified no-fly zones. The system does not, however, provide 
any assurance that the UAS will perform its intended mission 
while operating within its geospatial constraints. Safeguard is 
strictly an independent safety system. Such a safety system 
may facilitate airworthiness certification of UAS with non-
aviation-grade components that might pose challenges for 
conventional certification. 
In Safeguard, preflight constraints and termination policies 
can be defined and implemented by the operator or, in the 
future, by a service provider, by an established database of 
geospatial constraints, or by some combination of those. In the 
current prototype, the UAS operator identifies and loads the 
Safeguard unit with the desired constraints (e.g., stay-in and 
stay-out boundaries), buffer criteria (e.g., warning times), and 
vehicle dynamics parameters prior to flight. A flight plan may 
also be loaded if Safeguard is tasked with monitoring flight 
plan excursions beyond some threshold. In the future, pre-
flight information may come from a service provider, similar 
to the current digital notice to airmen (D-NOTAM) system 
that delivers no-fly zone information to manned aircraft and 
airline operations centers, or it may come from established 
databases of no-fly zones comparable to navigation databases 
used by CPA today.  
The termination policy may also be an operator decision or 
an airspace management decision. In other words, once 
Safeguard detects that a violation is imminent (i.e., the 
autopilot has not responded to a warning), then the action to 
be taken can vary based on an operator-defined policy or a 
regulatory policy that governs the airspace. Regardless, these 
policies must be established prior to flight so that appropriate 
standards can be applied. Safeguard is not designed to make 
decisions during flight as to best course of action in a given 
context. However, a complementary research effort is 
addressing this aspect [13]. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING 
BOUNDARY VIOLATIONS 
To enforce conformance to geospatial constraints, the 
Safeguard system establishes three boundaries for each stay-in 
and stay-out region: a hard boundary, a soft boundary, and a 
warning boundary, as shown in Figure 2 for simple square 
areas. The hard boundary, shown in red, is a user-defined 
polygon representing a geospatial region that should never be 
breached. Safeguard allows polygons to be virtually any shape 
or size, as long as the polygon is closed. The associated soft 
and warning boundaries follow the shape of the hard boundary 
with buffers based on the vehicle dynamics. The points that 
define the hard boundary are loaded prior to flight and do not 
change throughout a mission. It is considered a system failure 
if Safeguard does not prevent the UAS from violating any hard 
boundary. 
The soft boundary, indicated in yellow in Figure 2, 
specifies when a flight termination maneuver is necessary to 
ensure that the hard boundary is not violated. If the UA crosses 
the soft boundary, it is assumed that a loss of control or 
unrecoverable fly away has occurred; that is, the means to 
safely control a UA have been compromised in some manner. 
Therefore, flight termination is the only reliable method for 
preventing excursions into no-fly zones.  
To prevent any breaches of the hard boundaries, the 
Safeguard system computes the maximum distance that a UA 
could travel once flight termination is initiated. This distance is 
denoted as ε. Establishing the soft boundary at a distance ε 
from all points along the hard boundary ensures that a UA 
maintains a minimum safe separation distance (MSSD) from 
the hard boundary such that flight termination would prevent 
violations of no-fly zones. As the flight trajectory resulting 
from a flight termination signal is situational, the shape and 
size of soft boundaries dynamically change during flight. 
Changes are based on the current state of the vehicle, a set of 
parameters classifying the vehicles aerodynamics, as well as 
wind and weather conditions to some extent. Rudimentary 
methods for calculating the MSSD between a UAS and all hard 
boundaries are discussed in more detail later in this section and 
research toward more accurate methods for computing ε is 
discussed in Section VI. 
The final boundary, shown in green in Figure 2, is the 
warning boundary. The warning boundary defines the points 
when a notice will be issued to systems on a UAS (e.g., the 
autopilot) that a vehicle’s current state is approaching a soft 
boundary. While no direct action is commanded based on this 
warning, it allows the UAS to attempt to perform a 
contingency maneuver to avoid flight termination. The warning 
boundary dynamically changes as a function of ε multiplied by 
a tunable scale factor ρ (ρ>1). The scalar ρ is a tunable 
parameter to provide operators flexibility with respect to their 
desired proximity to the soft boundary where the termination 
signal will be generated. The operator can establish and load an 
appropriate scale factor such that Safeguard issues warnings at 
a distance of ρε from all points along the hard boundary. 
  
Figure 2. Conceptual Boundaries for Geospatial Constraint 
Conformance.  
 To create a system capable of reliably enforcing 
compliance with the aforementioned boundaries while 
simultaneously meeting other previously mentioned 
requirements, the system architecture shown in Figure 3 was 
derived. The hardware components consist of (a) a processor; 
(b) a GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS)/altimeter unit; (c) 
an optional alternative non-GPS positioning, navigation, and 
timekeeping (PNT) system; (d) an input port; and (e) three 
output ports. Prior to flight, boundary points designating stay-
in and stay-out regions, vehicle dynamics parameters, and an 
optional flight plan are loaded into Safeguard. This information 
can be manually entered by operators or it can be obtained 
through a service provider such as the UAS traffic management 
(UTM) system [14], which is currently under development. At 
start-up, the termination and warning lines default to a 
“violation” state and are only set to a “compliant” state when 
the system receives sufficient proof that the vehicle’s state is 
compliant with all conformance criteria. This prevents the UAS 
from taking off until the Safeguard system has been properly 
initialized and deems the vehicle’s current state to be safe for 
operation with respect to the conformance criteria.  
 
 
Figure 3. System Architecture (Figure will be expanded 
across both columns in final format.) 
 
 Prior to flight, multiple inputs are required to ensure 
intended functionality of the Safeguard system. Those inputs 
include hard boundary points to indicate all no-fly zones and 
vehicle dynamics coefficients to represent the aerodynamics 
model of the UAS. If a flight plan is loaded, Safeguard can 
check for violations of the intended path with any geospatial 
constraints, or it can monitor for excessive flight plan 
deviations if desired. Due to the functional importance of valid 
and correct geo-referenced hard boundary points, all such data 
are captured, processed, and transferred in accordance with 
appropriate Data Processing Assurance Levels (DPAL) as 
defined in [15] for similar types of data used on commercial 
aircraft (e.g., for navigation data). These points can either be 
obtained from an authorized service provider, or through 
manual input of surveyed locations captured by the operator or 
from qualified professionals. 
 Once properly initialized, the Safeguard system begins 
monitoring to detect any breaches of the defined boundaries. 
With each sample of the PNT data, the warning and terminate 
lines are set to either “compliant” or “violation”, accordingly. 
To properly interpret the meaning of these two signals, these 
lines usually are connected to two separate elements of the 
UAS. The warning line is typically connected to a system that 
has control authority of the aircraft, such as the autopilot, to 
allow that system to initiate a contingency maneuver to avoid 
flight termination. Because off-the-shelf UAS systems may 
fail, Safeguard’s ability to command flight termination is 
independent of other systems on-board the UAS. The terminate 
line is connected to a separate termination mechanism that 
complies with appropriate airworthiness standards. Finally, a 
message containing diagnostic information is output via a 
serial connection from the system. This message is not 
necessary for proper operation of the Safeguard system, but it 
can be used by the operator to monitor the state of the aircraft 
and the state of the Safeguard system for situational awareness. 
All outputs coming from the Safeguard system are optically 
isolated to inhibit any signals from entering the system during 
operations.  
A. Calculation of a Minimum Safe Separation Distance 
To assure containment based on the boundary definitions 
shown in Figure 2, it is necessary to calculate a MSSD between 
the hard boundary and the soft boundary. In the current 
prototype, the MSSD is calculated and updated during flight, 
based on the vehicle’s state and a small set of parameters to 
describe the vehicle’s aerodynamic characteristics. Currently, 
the vehicle’s state is defined as its current geo-referenced 
position, x = [x, y, z], velocity, v = [vx, vy, vz], and attitude, Ψ 
= [φ, θ, ψ], and a set of vehicle dynamics parameters: mass, 
spatial area of the wings, nominal lift to drag ratio, degraded 
lift to drag ratio (after termination is initiated), lift coefficient, 
and drag coefficient. In future iterations of the Safeguard 
system, metrics to describe wind conditions will be included. 
 Results from simulations of the MSSD calculation are 
shown below for a ~10 lb multi-rotor in Figure 4 and a small 
fixed wing UAS in Figure 5. These results represent the 
possible flight trajectories of the two UAS after a termination is 
initiated. As a multi-rotor can change directions quickly, its 
possible trajectories are all nearly equidistant from the UAS’s 
 current location. The possible trajectories of a fixed wing 
aircraft form a fan pattern symmetric with respect to the 
aircraft’s velocity vector. In scenarios where control authority 
of the aircraft is lost, the trajectories shown below represent the 
typical behavior of their respective platforms.  
 
Figure 4. Modeled Trajectory of a Multi-Rotor UAS after 
Flight Termination When Hovering at 400 meters. 
 
 
Figure 5. Modeled Trajectory of a Fixed Wing UAS after 
Flight Termination When Flying at 400 meters and 80 knots in 
a Northeast Direction. 
IV. ASSURANCE APPROACH 
One of the unique and essential attributes of the 
Safeguard concept is that it is designed to meet stringent 
standards such as those established for safety-critical systems 
on commercial aircraft and/or spacecraft. The intent is to 
provide a certifiable system consistent with Proposal 6 in 
EASA’s UAS framework “to prevent unintended flight 
outside safe areas and to increase compliance to applicable 
regulation” [8]. The following are the four main elements of 
the Safeguard system being addressed in the research, 
development, and testing of prototypes: 
1. Positioning system  
2. Boundary Database (e.g., hard boundaries) 
3. Boundary Monitoring and Violation Detection 
Software  
4. Termination mechanism 
 
Our approach to assurance for each of the four system 
elements is briefly described below. An initial set of hazards 
and considerations for mitigation are provided in the 
Appendix. 
  
A. Positioning System Performance 
For the Safeguard system to reliably perform its 
monitoring function, accurate and timely position estimates 
are critical. For CPA, positioning data is available from a 
myriad of independent systems such as GPS, very high 
frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) stations, distance 
measuring equipment (DME), tactical air navigation 
(TACAN) stations, and high quality inertial navigation 
systems (INSs). Additionally, for CPA, redundancy is 
employed to mitigate any potential failures and ensure 
continuous operations. Unfortunately, UAS typically operate 
at low altitudes making ground-based radio frequency systems 
like VOR, DME and TACAN unobservable due to line of 
sight issues. Moreover, most UAS operate with sensors that 
are lightweight and relatively low cost. This typically results 
in a lower performing positioning system consisting of a GPS 
receiver and a lower-grade inertial measurement unit (IMU). 
For Safeguard to be an effective monitor, the performance of 
its positioning system must be better than the performance of 
the system embedded within the UAS. 
For many UAS operational scenarios, GPS can provide 
adequate accuracy, availability, and continuity; particularly if 
applying well-established techniques for improving its 
performance such as receiver autonomous integrity monitoring 
(RAIM), the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), or a 
satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS). However, for 
some safety-critical applications, GPS is not a viable stand-
alone option. For example, when operating in environments 
such as urban canyons or around dense foliage, GPS signals 
may be unattainable or significantly deteriorated due to 
shadowing, signal attenuation, or multipath issues. 
Furthermore, GPS is inherently susceptible to intentional or 
unintentional jamming as well as sophisticated attacks such as 
spoofing. One common method to augment GPS in 
challenging environments is integration with an IMU [18]. 
This integration has been shown to increase positioning 
accuracy and availability as well as allow for operations to 
continue during short GPS outages. However, a GPS/IMU 
integration is still reliant on GPS signals for long term 
stability, and therefore, may not be sufficient for some 
missions. Due to these issues, a secondary independent 
positioning system can become necessary to augment GPS.  
There are many active research and development efforts 
attempting to find a solution to this problem. These efforts 
include a wide array of ideas ranging from prominent 
techniques such as vision and laser-based navigation [19], to 
less pervasive ideas such as navigating off of magnetic fields 
[20] or using signals of opportunity [21]. Unfortunately, none 
of these concepts have as yet demonstrated the reliability and 
dependability needed for a safety-critical system such as 
Safeguard. Based on the amount of research being dedicated 
 to this problem and the importance of finding a solution, it is 
assumed that eventually there will be an alternative ubiquitous 
positioning system capable of serving as a viable backup to 
GPS. As such, we designed our architecture to be easily 
adaptable to new positioning systems in the future.  
While an independent global positioning solution is not 
currently available, multiple local positioning systems (LPS) 
have demonstrated the ability to serve as backups for GPS 
within a localized region. To develop and test Safeguard’s 
functionality without requiring sole reliance on GPS, a 
Locata® LPS [22] was chosen as the alternative PNT (APNT) 
system. The Locata® system uses a network of ground-based 
transceivers to provide geo-referenced positioning to mobile 
receivers within range of the radio frequency signals.  
In summary, the Safeguard positioning system must 
perform well with respect to accuracy, integrity, availability, 
and continuity of service. How well will depend on the mission 
to be flown and the level of risk deemed acceptable with 
respect to violating prescribed constraints (e.g., hard 
boundaries). Given these requirements, the Safeguard 
positioning system architecture can be tailored to meet them, 
applying many of the techniques established for CPA. 
B. Boundary Database Integrity 
The second essential input to the detection algorithm is the 
set of constraints that are specified pre-flight and loaded onto 
the Safeguard unit. Of these, the most complex and vulnerable 
to errors are the polygons that represent the hard boundaries 
(i.e., no-fly zones). Fortunately, there are several established 
industry standards for assuring the content and quality of these 
types of data. These standards were established for commercial 
transport aircraft that utilize similar geospatial data for 
navigation and situation awareness systems, where probability 
of failure must be very low. For the Safeguard databases, we 
leverage and apply relevant aspects from four of these 
standards [15][23][24][25]. A fifth is also relevant and used as 
guidance [26]. A sixth is currently being revised and may also 
include relevant material [27]. Only the first four will be 
summarized here with respect to their role in Safeguard 
database assurance. 
Standards for geospatial databases that contain data 
representing airport features, terrain, and/or obstacles are 
defined in [23] and [24]. Database elements are defined using 
points to represent the vertices of closed polygons. The 
standards specify general requirements (e.g., the spatial and 
temporal reference system) and specific rules for how to 
capture polygons, what types of polygons to capture, how and 
how often to update these data, and how good the data must be 
(i.e., data quality requirements). The feature types that are 
relevant to Safeguard are vertical objects, aerodrome 
structures, and terrain features. Each may be used as a basis for 
defining a hard boundary for a stay-in or stay-out region in 
Safeguard. 
Standards for the exchange of geospatial databases are 
defined in [25]. Because data may come from multiple sources 
and may be used by multiple applications, a standard data 
model must be used to assure consistent interpretation. 
Safeguard will apply this model when data representing hard 
boundaries must be combined from multiple sources to create a 
complete set, or when interpreting data provided by others in 
accordance with the standard.  
Standards for processing databases that are to be used 
onboard aircraft are defined in [15]. Any data to be acquired, 
processed, and loaded onto an aircraft system should comply 
with this standard, as well as guidance provided in [26]. The 
primary intents are to assure that (a) the data provided meets all 
of the requirements for its intended use, and (b) data has not 
been altered or corrupted since origination. Seven quality 
characteristics are established in [15] wherein evidence must 
be provided to support the claims of the designer with respect 
to meeting the system’s data quality requirements. These are: 
1. Accuracy – The degree of conformance between the 
estimated or measured value and its true value 
2. Resolution – The number of units or digits to which a 
measured or calculated value is expressed and used 
3. Assurance Level – The degree of confidence that a data 
element is not corrupted while stored or in transmission 
4. Traceability – The degree that a system or a data 
product can provide a record of the changes made to 
that product and thereby enable an audit trail to be 
followed from the end-user to the data originator 
5. Timeliness – The degree of confidence that the data is 
applicable to the period of its intended use 
6. Completeness – The degree of confidence that all of 
the data needed to support the intended use is provided 
7. Format – The structure of data elements, records and 
files arranged to meet standards, specifications or data 
quality requirements 
For Safeguard, the requirements for six of these are given 
in [15][23][24][25] and are assumed to be sufficient for most 
missions. Characteristic #3 is referred to as the Data Processing 
Assurance Level (DPAL) and, per the standard, may be one of 
three levels (1, 2, or 3); with “1” being the highest degree of 
confidence. Typically, the DPAL will correspond to the Design 
Assurance Level (DAL) associated with the software that uses 
the database [16]. For example, a DPAL of “1” corresponds to 
a DAL of “A” and “B” (that is, software whose anomalous 
behavior could contribute to a catastrophic or hazardous failure 
condition). 
As with positioning system performance, it is expected that 
the DPAL requirement for pre-loaded data in Safeguard will 
vary across missions and operating environments based on the 
level of risk deemed acceptable with respect to violating 
prescribed constraints (e.g., hard boundaries). For research and 
development purposes, we assume the most stringent will be 
required (DPAL 1). The method to achieve DPAL 1 will 
depend on whether the data originates locally via a process 
managed and performed by the operator, or the data is provided 
as a service from a certified source. Details on both of these 
methods will be published separately. 
 C. Verification of Boundary Detection Software 
To support the creation of highly-assured algorithms, the 
boundary detection and violation recognition functions 
embedded within the Safeguard code have been developed and 
verified using formal methods [28]. Work is also in progress to 
develop the software in compliance with NASA’s software 
safety requirements. In addition, Monte Carlo evaluations were 
conducted in Matlab to provide evidence of proper 
functionality of the boundary detection and violation 
algorithms. During these experiments, results were compiled 
and evaluated for each function used for boundary detection 
and violation based on a large set of inputs that were randomly 
generated across the spectrum of possibilities. An example of 
the results produced through Monte Carlo evaluations are 
shown below in Figure 6. In this example, functions designed 
to determine if a given point is inside or outside arbitrarily 
shaped polygons were evaluated. One stay-in region as well as 
three stay-out regions were created and 1,000,000 random 
points were assessed for compliance. Points deemed to be in 
compliance with all designated regions are shown in green, 
while points that are in violation of the regions are shown in 
red. Through evaluation of the results, it was observed that all 
of the generated points were properly identified as either in 
violation or compliant. Similar analyses were conducted for 
each formally verified function. 
 
 
Figure 6. Monte Carlo Evaluation of Boundary Violation 
Function. 
 
D. Testing the Termination Mechanism 
Unlike other components of the Safeguard system, the 
mechanism to initiate a flight termination must be somewhat 
vehicle specific. The main drivers behind this are (1) the 
termination policy established by the operator or regulator; (2) 
the aerodynamic differences between rotorcraft and fixed wing 
aircraft; and (3) the propulsion differences between battery and 
gas-powered vehicles. Without the use of incendiaries, which 
is not considered a safe option in many cases, there is no 
termination system that is completely vehicle agnostic. 
Therefore, the Safeguard system has been designed to function 
with a few different termination strategies. 
For testing to date, two termination policies have been 
used. Flight termination is achieved by discontinuing power to 
the motors, or for certain aircraft, forcing control surfaces into 
specific positions. To halt power to the motors of an electric 
vehicle, simply severing one of the battery cables will nearly 
instantaneously yield the desired results. This can be 
accomplished through the use of COTS electrically triggered 
cable cutters such as those designed to remotely diffuse 
explosives [29]. For a gas-powered vehicle, power can be 
denied to the motors by choking the fuel line and stopping the 
injection of gas into the motor.  
In certain cases, such as a sailplane or flying wing, simply 
discontinuing power to the motors will not adequately 
terminate flight as the vehicle can glide for too great a distance. 
In these situations, it is desirable to force certain control 
surfaces into specific positions to expedite the termination 
process. For example, many fixed wing aircraft can be 
terminated quickly by commanding both ailerons into opposing 
maximum positions and the rudder to a maximum state. The 
inclusion of control surfaces in the termination process is 
typically only needed for fixed wing vehicles, but could be 
employed on multi-rotors if needed. The challenge, if control 
surfaces need to be included in the termination process, is to 
provide a function to actuate them independently of other UAS 
systems, including the autopilot and any primary wires, cables, 
and power sources. 
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT 
To test the validity of the concepts underlying Safeguard, 
an initial prototype system was created. This prototype, shown 
integrated onto a multi-rotor in Figure 7, was designed with 
COTS hardware to rapidly evaluate the effectiveness of the 
Safeguard algorithms and methodology. The warning line was 
connected to the vehicle’s autopilot, the terminate line was 
connected to a system which simply disconnected power to the 
UAS’ motors, and the diagnostic message was wirelessly 
transmitted to a laptop base station.  
 
 
Figure 7. Safeguard Prototype on a Multi-rotor UAS (2015). 
Using this prototype Safeguard system, multiple test flights 
were conducted. To show that the Safeguard system is vehicle 
and autopilot agnostic, tests were completed on various 
rotorcraft platforms, each operating with dissimilar autopilots. 
Experiments were designed and conducted that resulted in 
vehicle contingency maneuvers as well as flight terminations. 
 These successful test flights demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the Safeguard system for assured geospatial containment 
within designated boundaries. Portions of the test flights can be 
viewed online [30]. 
A second prototype is currently being tested (Figure 8). The 
five primary objectives of this test phase are to: (1) 
demonstrate performance across additional vehicle types, 
including small fixed-wing UAS; (2) demonstrate functionality 
during periods of degraded GPS performance, including loss of 
GPS; (3) evaluate alternate termination strategies; (4) 
demonstrate integration with UTM services; and (5) test across 
two mission types. The first mission employs Safeguard as a 
monitor for test range excursions when a vehicle is operating 
beyond visual line-of-sight (i.e., serves as a virtual Range 
Safety Officer). The second mission employs Safeguard to 
monitor for safe stand-off distance while a UAS is inspecting 
power system transmission lines and associated structures. If 
the UAS gets too close to the transmission line or structures, 
Safeguard signals the UAS to retreat. This work is currently in 
preparation for publication. 
 
Figure 8. Current Safeguard Prototype (2016). 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
To develop Safeguard to the desired DAL, much work still 
remains to be done. This work includes hardware development, 
improving the computational robustness of the MSSD 
estimation (i.e., the soft boundary), as well as system-level 
V&V. While a vast majority of the software currently 
implemented on Safeguard has been rigorously developed and 
scrutinized, several hardware components are COTS products 
with no associated reliability estimates. Moreover, little effort 
has been spent to minimize the size, weight, power and cost 
(SWAP-C) of the hardware. However, based on an analysis of 
the computing and sensor requirements for Safeguard, it is 
believed that a ruggedized version could be produced to the 
form factor shown in Figure 1. Reducing the SWAP-C and 
converting to ruggedized hardware will be necessary steps in 
the development of Safeguard. Steps are underway to achieve 
this via partnering discussions with manufacturers of similar 
devices, as well as using NASA in-house expertise. 
To improve the MSSD estimation, work is underway to 
better characterize vehicle dynamics. We believe that loading a 
small set of vehicle dynamics parameters may be sufficient to 
characterize the vehicle for our purposes, rather than loading a 
high-fidelity aerodynamic model. While the current set of 
vehicle dynamics have been shown to adequately describe 
multiple UAS, additional testing is needed for a broader range 
of aircraft. Data captured during flight termination events may 
also help refine the MSSD estimation. As it is not practical to 
terminate a multitude of vehicles, a newly developed UAS 
simulation capability at NASA Langley is being leveraged. 
This simulation enables testing and refinement of different 
computational methods for determining the MSSD in an 
accelerated and benign fashion. The UAS simulator will allow 
for accelerated Monte Carlo evaluations across a span of input 
uncertainties and other failure modes without having to 
physically crash an abundance of UAS.  
The other uncertainty that can affect the MSSD estimate is 
wind. One approach being explored is overbounding wind 
speeds and directions. Flights may also be restricted from 
takeoff if winds exceed a certain threshold. 
Conducting test flights on various UAS in various 
environmental conditions (e.g. in wind conditions and in 
rugged terrain with GPS dropouts) will be a necessary part of 
V&V of the Safeguard device.  Flight test data will be used to 
verify that the system works as designed, and will also serve to 
validate data used in the Monte Carlo simulations. Flight test 
data in conjunction with the data gathered during the 
development in compliance with NASA standards will be used 
to support a safety case for using Safeguard.  
Finally, over the next 2-3 years, phased integration testing 
is planned with other complimentary systems including 
ICAROUS [13] and UTM [14] that are being developed 
concurrently. In a similar fashion to Safeguard, ICAROUS is 
being designed to monitor conformance to a set of rules in 
addition to performing collision avoidance with other 
cooperative (known) aircraft. These two systems complement 
each other as ICAROUS has the decision and control authority 
that Safeguard lacks, while Safeguard can provide the 
independent highly assured monitoring function that 
ICAROUS does not possess. The other system that Safeguard 
will be integrated with, UTM, is a service-oriented ground-
based architecture that will provide for air traffic management 
of low altitude UAS operations, much like the current ATM 
system provides for safe CPA operations. As described 
previously, Safeguard can be configured to receive operational 
constraints (e.g., no-fly zones) from a UTM-like service. In 
addition, Safeguard could provide the “heartbeat” signal 
required by UTM for UAS operating in its managed airspace. 
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 VII. APPENDIX: PRELIMINARY LIST OF SAFEGUARD HAZARDS AND MITIGATION CONSIDERATIONS 
No. Hazards Mitigation Considerations 
1 Degraded, or loss of, positioning system data (e.g., loss of 
GPS, inaccurate estimates) 
Employ RAIM, WAAS, SBAS, and/or GPS-independent APNT system 
as necessary to meet mission-specific requirements for accuracy, 
integrity, availability, and continuity of service; Leverage 
established/proven integration techniques (e.g. for GPS/INS/APNT) 
Use proven and flight-qualified connectors and cabling 
2 Invalid constraint data (e.g., incorrect or missing survey data 
for hard boundaries) 
Comply with industry standards for data capture, maintenance, 
processing and quality assurance [15][23][24] [25] as necessary to meet 
mission-specific requirements; Leverage existing authorized processes 
and products as able 
3 Invalid or insufficient setting of warning and soft boundaries 
(e.g., incorrect assumptions regarding ballistic flight 
trajectory after killing power) 
Buffers may not allow enough time for autopilot response or for flight 
termination to stay within boundary.   
Conservative setting of buffers based on Monte Carlo simulations and/or 
testing to limit the possibility of any collateral damage (e.g., parts or 
debris leaving the containment region). Simulations should evaluate 
across anticipated wind, sensor, and aerodynamic uncertainties; 
Constrain operations to an upper wind limit if necessary. 
Comply with standards for software assurance [16][31]; 
Use proven and flight-qualified operating system, memory, and central 
processing unit hardware 
4 Failure to predict or inaccurate prediction of a boundary 
violation (e.g., missed detection or false alarm) 
Apply formal methods to verify approach for determining stay-in/stay-
out status.  Comply with standards for software assurance [16][31]; Set 
required assurance level or software classification in accordance with 
acceptable missed detection rate 
Use proven and flight-qualified operating system, memory, and central 
processing unit hardware 
5 Failure to command or inappropriate command for 
contingency action for warning violation (e.g., signal to the 
autopilot for contingency response) 
Comply with standards for software and hardware assurance [16][17]. 
Use proven and flight-qualified operating system, memory, and central 
processing unit hardware 
Use proven and flight-qualified connectors and cabling 
6 Failure to command or inappropriate command for flight 
termination 
Termination mechanism shall comply with standards for software and 
hardware assurance [16][17]. 
Use proven and flight-qualified operating system, memory, and central 
processing unit hardware 
Use proven and flight-qualified connectors and cabling 
7 Failure of or insufficient power (e.g., failure of the battery or 
any power source supporting the Safeguard unit or 
termination mechanism) 
Use proven and flight-qualified battery with at least 3x margin with 
respect to expected flight time 
 
8 Failure or degradation of the diagnostic link to the ground-
based operator (e.g., for cases where Safeguard is to warn a 
remote pilot of a buffer violation) 
Confirm that autopilot-based contingency maneuvers can be a fail-safe 
default when a warning is issued but communication link has failed 
 
 
 
